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Introduction 
On 5 May 1941 Emperor aylÃ llase I, recently restored to the throne of 
Ethiopia, delivered a stirring message of hope, triumph and future expecta-
tions from the steps of his imperial palace in Addis AbÃba. Within his 
speech, the Emperor of Ethiopia declared, 
It is my firm wish and purpose to merit the blessing with which God 
in His mercy has visited us, first, by sharing our gratitude to our Al-
lies, the British ߑ secondly, to do work beneficial to the people and 
the country by establishing in our Ethiopia a Government which will 
protect the Faith and cause it to be respected, and by guaranteeing 
liberty of the people and Freedom of conscience.1 
However, from 1941 to 1944, Emperor aylÃ llase I realized that the 
price of British aid was far more costly than mere gratitude and that the 
liberty and freedom of his people hard won from Italian rule would have to 
be re-won from British rule. But why was he able to succeed in removing 
British rule from Ethiopia by the end of 1944? What strategy and tactics did 
the Emperor of Ethiopia utilize to systematically remove British adminis-
trative, economic, territorial, infrastructural and informational control of 
Ethiopia? In an effort to answer these questions this study will argue that 
Emperor aylÃ llase I regained de facto control over Ethiopia prior to his 
signing of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944 by engaging in a pre-
Cold War variant of flexible response which employed the tactics of ob-
structionism, opportunism, brinksmanship, leverage and propaganda to 
compel the British to surrender control of Ethiopia to its emperor.2 
 
1 EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I, Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie 
the First 1918 to 1967, Addis Ababa: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information, 
1967, p. 338. 
2 The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944 is an arbitrary title the author of this text 
assigned to this agreement. The proper title of this agreement is Agreement between 
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By analysing The Times (London) and New Times & Ethiopia News 
(London) newspaper accounts; memoirs of American and British travellers, 
soldiers, and diplomats to Ethiopia; the autobiography of Emperor aylÃ 
llase I; American, British and Ethiopian letters and correspondences; 
American, British and Ethiopian government documents and a wide variety 
of secondary sources this study will assess the history of the Emperor of 
Ethiopia߈s relationship with the British Empire; determine the extent of 
British military control over Ethiopia during the occupation of the empire 
from 1941 to 1944; and analyse Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s overall strategy 
and tactics to remove British control over his empire. 
Born under the name TÃfÃri MÃkwÃnnn on 23 July 1892, Emperor aylÃ 
llase I was the son of Ras MÃkwÃnnn WÃldÃ Mikael Gudisa, the gover-
nor of the province of HarÃr in eastern Ethiopia.3 The formative years of his 
life were spent under his father߈s tutelage and established a pace by which 
the future emperor would find himself steadily elevated from one position 
of power to another. For example, at the age of 13, the young TÃfÃri 
MÃkwÃnnn became dÃazma. In 1907, he was appointed by Emperor 
Mnilk II to the governorship of the province of Sidamo. In 1911, TÃfÃri 
MÃkwÃnnn was installed as governor of HarÃr and later that year married 
MÃnÃn Asfaw of AmbassÃl, the niece of the heir to the throne of Ethiopia, 
Iyasu V.4 In the aftermath of the deposition of Iyasu V, DÃazma TÃfÃri 
was elevated to the rank of ras by Empress ZÃwditu and ensconced as heir 
apparent to the imperial throne in 1917. During his regency, Ras TÃfÃri in 
concert with ߃ and sometimes against ߃ the wishes of Empress ZÃwditu and 
her supporters began to implement domestic and foreign policy reforms 
designed to modernize Ethiopia ranging from the abolition of slavery and 
the slave trade within the borders of the empire to entry into the League of 
 
His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor 
of Ethiopia Addis Ababa, 19th December 1944, London: His Majesty߈s Stationery Of-
fice 1945. 
3 The aforementioned titles and their definitions can be found in HAROLD GOLDEN 
MARCUS, A History of Ethiopia, Updated Edition, Berkeley: University of California 
Press 1994, pp. 280߃283. 
4 Emperor Mnilk II ruled from 1889 to 1913 and Iyasu V ruled from 1911 to 1916. 
Some of the biographical data on Emperor aylÃ llase I was derived from C.G.H. 
HILL, ߇Ethiopian Personalities߈ 11 December 1942, in: PAUL PRESTON ߃ MICHAEL 
PARTRIDGE (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part III: From 1940 through 1945, Series G: Africa, 
Vol. 2: Africa, January 1942߃March 1943, Washington, D.C.: University Publications 
of America 1989, p. 171. It must be denoted that the veracity of British foreign policy 
reports has been called into question by some scholars of Ethiopian studies who view 
the data recorded within such reports as an exaggeration of actual events. 
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Nations in 1923.5 Five years later, Empress ZÃwditu crowned Ras TÃfÃri as 
ngu of Ethiopia. In the aftermath of a brief rebellion by Empress 
ZÃwditu߈s former husband Ras Gugsa WÃle against Ras TÃfÃri and the death 
of Empress ZÃwditu herself on 2 April 1930, Ngu TÃfÃri was crowned 
Emperor aylÃ llase I at Addis AbÃba߈s Cathedral of St George on 2 
November 1930.6 While Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s rise to power was mete-
oric, his relationship with the British Empire can best be described as one of 
cautious ambivalence. 
Emperor aylÃ llase I and the British Empire 
The cautious ambivalence which defined the Emperor of Ethiopia߈s rela-
tionship with Great Britain was grounded within the history of Anglo-
Ethiopian relations in the latter half of the nineteenth and early third of the 
twentieth centuries. Their relationship was a cautious one because Great 
Britain was one of three European empires which surrounded Ethiopia with 
colonies. The Italian Empire held Italian Eritrea along Ethiopia߈s northern 
border and Italian Somaliland in the south-east. The French Empire con-
trolled French Somaliland in the north-east while the British Empire ruled 
British Somaliland in the east, Kenya in the south and the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan in the west and north-west. In addition to his empire߈s tenuous geo-
graphical position, Ras TÃfÃri߈s cautiousness in dealing with the British was 
influenced by the Tripartite Agreement of 1906 formed between his Euro-
pean colonial neighbours before a stroke physically incapacitated his prede-
cessor Emperor Mnilk II in 1907. To protect their political and territorial 
interests in the Horn of Africa and avoid a conflict among themselves 
should the Ethiopian empire collapse upon the death of the ailing emperor; 
Great Britain, Italy and France agreed to guarantee the independence and 
political integrity of Ethiopia as long as the empire remained intact, yet 
divided the country among themselves into ߇spheres of influence߈ should 
their worst concerns be realized.7 
Added to Ethiopia߈s geographical position and the Tripartite Agreement of 
1906, Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s cautious dealings with the British was tem-
pered by the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1925 which clearly defined British 
 
5 RICHARD PANKHURST, The Ethiopians, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998, pp. 
210߃211. 
6 MARCUS, A History of Ethiopia, 1994, pp. 132߃133. 
7 The official title of ߇The Tripartite Agreement of 1906߈ is Agreement between Great 
Britain, France and Italy, respecting Abyssinia. Signed at London 13th December, 1906. 
Sir EDWARD HERTSLET, The Map of Africa by Treaty, II (102) London: Frank Cass & 
Co. Ltd. 1967, pp. 436߃444. 
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economic and territorial interests in the region. Within his autobiography, 
Emperor aylÃ llase I expressed his trepidations over this treaty, 
Our Government has recently received identical notes written by both 
the British and Italian governments informing Us of their agreement 
for Britain to dam Lake Tana [which would give the British control 
over the headwaters of the Nile River] and for Italy to construct a rail-
way traversing Ethiopia [a railway designed to link Italian Eritrea to 
Italian Somaliland]. We are greatly distressed about this agreement be-
ing concluded by the two governments among themselves alone, with-
out informing Us, and then simply sending Us joint notifications.8 
While Ras TÃfÃri߈s initial reaction was to bring the matter before the 
League of Nations and protest against its implementation in that venue, the 
future Emperor of Ethiopia was both alert and leery of a possible military 
invasion by the British. In light of the Anglo-Abyssinian War of 1867߃1868 
in which the British invaded Ethiopia, rescued several of their citizens, dip-
lomats and other Europeans from Emperor Tewodros II; Emperor aylÃ 
llase I believed that the British under a political pretext ߃ the collapse of 
the Ethiopian government, a social pretext ߃ the abolition of Ethiopian slav-
ery, or an economic pretext-the control and/or ending of the Ethiopian 
arms trade would invade Ethiopia by itself or as part of a European military 
alliance designed to partition the Horn of African nation. Boake Carter, an 
American writer and traveller to the region observed during an audience 
with Emperor aylÃ llase I, 
Someday, he mused a decade ago when he first came into absolute 
power, some great powerful nation of Europe will use the prevalence 
of slavery in Ethiopia as an excuse to invade its territory rich in farm-
lands and minerals.9 
On the other hand, Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s relationship with the British 
Empire was also founded upon a measure of ambivalence. In 1923 the British 
government sponsored Ethiopia߈s entry into the League of Nations yet did so 
on a pledge from Ras TÃfÃri that his empire would adhere to the arms control 
Convention of St. Germain of 1919 and pledge to end domestic slavery and 
the slave trade. Before his ascension to the throne of Ethiopia, Ras TÃfÃri was 
honoured with several decorations from the British. 
 
8 EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I, ߇My Life and Ethiopia߈s Progress߈ 1892߃1937: The Auto-
biography of Emperor Haile Selassie I. London: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 81. 
9 BOAKE CARTER, Black Shirt Black Skin, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1927, 
p. 52. 
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He was given the G.C.M.G. [Knight Grand Cross of the Most Dis-
tinguished Order of St Michael and St George] on his appointment as 
heir apparent in 1916, the G.C.B. [Knight Grand Cross of the Most 
Honourable Order of the Bath] and the degree of LL.D. [Doctor of 
Laws] during a visit paid to England in 1924 and the chain of the 
Royal Victorian Order on the occasion of the Duke of Gloucester߈s 
mission to Abyssinia in November 1930.10 
However, during his exile in Great Britain, Emperor aylÃ llase I be-
lieved he was personally dishonoured by his British ally when Great Britain 
and Italy concluded an agreement on 16 April 1938 that recognized the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 as a lawful conquest. In an interview 
with a reporter from the Daily Mail, the Emperor of Ethiopia expressed his 
disgust over the matter, 
The reporter asked: ߋDuring your long ordeal, has the British gov-
ernment encouraged you in any way?ߌ We answered that ߋas a mem-
ber of the League of Nations, Great Britain has strengthened my be-
lief in the League but, beyond this, has not given me any help.ߌ11 
And while the British safely and successfully spirited Emperor aylÃ 
llase I and his family from Ethiopia on 5 May 1936 and relocated them to 
England as the Italians marched towards Addis AbÃba; until 11 May 1941 
the British government refused to symbolically acknowledge Ethiopia as an 
ally by preventing the broadcasting of the Ethiopian national anthem on the 
nation߈s airwaves. This gesture was a wartime courtesy the British Broad-
casting Corporation extended to France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other 
nations victimized by Axis aggression.12 By the time Emperor aylÃ 
llase I victoriously re-entered Addis AbÃba on 5 May 1941, his past rela-
tionship with the British weighed very heavily upon his current dealings 
with them. 
He was an emperor among his people, but he was not yet ruler in 
Addis Ababa, occupied in April 1941 by the British, who had imme-
diately established a military government for what they considered 
occupied enemy territory.13 
 
10 HILL, ߋEthiopian Personalitiesߌ 11 December 1942, in: PRESTON ߃ PARTRIDGE (eds.), 
British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 1989, p. 431. 
11 EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I, My Life and Ethiopia߈s Progress, 1994, p. 60. 
12 RICHARD PANKHURST, ߋThe Ethiopian National Anthem in 1940: A Chapter in Anglo-
Ethiopian Wartime Relationsߌ Ethiopia Observer 14 (3), 1971, p. 219. 
13 MARCUS, The Politics of Empire, 1994, p. 7. 
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In an effort to remove the British from his empire, restore his nation߈s 
sovereignty and regain his full authority and power, Emperor aylÃ 
llase I devised an informal strategy of resistance designed to weaken and 
eventually eliminate British control over the administrative, territorial, in-
frastructural and informational affairs of Ethiopia. 
Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s Strategy of Resistance 
The Emperor of Ethiopia߈s strategy of resistance was a pre-Cold War vari-
ant of the doctrine of flexible response. This doctrine was ߇based upon a 
flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses ߑ To all levels of ag-
gression or threats of aggression.߈14 The goal of Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s 
strategy was to compel the British to quit their rule over Ethiopia without 
provoking them into a violent response and/or disproportionate use of 
force which could either destroy his resistance, cripple his attempts to re-
gain de facto control over his empire or harden British resolve to maintain 
the occupation. A crucial aspect of the emperor߈s strategy was not to attack 
the British government directly but the instruments of power the British 
utilized to maintain control over his empire. For example, Emperor aylÃ 
llase I employed such tactics as obstructionism, opportunism, brinksman-
ship, leverage and propaganda to attack the instruments of British control ߃ 
the British military, advisors, media and financial institutions ߃ over the 
administrative, economic, infrastructural, informational and territorial life 
of Ethiopia. His probable rationale for utilizing such a strategy of resistance 
revolved around the fact that as much as he wanted an Ethiopia free of Brit-
ish rule, he still believed himself to be indebted to them for the sacrifices 
they made in his restoration to the throne. Also, Emperor aylÃ llase I 
may have been reluctant to engage his people in another war of insurrection 
against a European power in the immediate aftermath of the Second Italo-
Ethiopian War. As displayed within another part of his victory speech, Em-
peror aylÃ llase I admonished his subjects, 
Take care not to spoil the good name of Ethiopia by acts which are 
worthy of the enemy. We shall see that our enemies are dismissed and 
sent the way they came. As St. George who killed the dragon is the 
Patron Saint of our army as well as of our allies, let us unite with our 
allies in everlasting friendship and amity in order to be able to stand 
 
14 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, ߋDefense Planning Committee Final 
CommuniquÈ,ߌ Brussels, 13߃14 December 1967, in: North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, NATO Final Communiques 1, 1949߃1974, Brussels: NATO Information Services 
1974, p. 197. 
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against the godless and cruel dragon which has newly risen and which 
is oppressing mankind.15 
But as he spoke of a Fascist dragon which was currently stalking the 
world, the Emperor of Ethiopia confronted a British lion which was cur-
rently stalking his home. 
Obstructionism and Administrative Control 
Once the Ethiopian patriots and the British military defeated the Italian 
army in early 1941 and the empire became increasingly secure, the British 
military placed Ethiopia along with Italian Eritrea and Italian Somaliland 
under the control of the Occupied Enemy Territorial Administration 
(OETA) based in Nairobi, Kenya and led by General Sir Philip Mitchell, an 
ex-colonial governor. 
The area came, as we shall see, under control of colonially minded 
British military officials, several of whom had lived and served in 
such British or British-controlled territories as Kenya, Uganda or the 
Sudan. Such officials were unfamiliar with the hopes and aspirations 
of an independent African state, and had remarkably little sympathy 
for them.16 
One example of their lack of sympathy was the appointment of British 
military, economic and political advisors to the Ethiopian bureaucracy 
without the Emperor߈s consent in a genuine effort to administratively re-
store the country but also to strengthen the British government߈s hold over 
Emperor aylÃ llase I, the imperial court and the empire itself. In the 
British Parliament, the role of British advisors in Ethiopia was openly de-
bated when Lord Noel-Buxton declared, 
He [Emperor aylÃ llase I] therefore needs very real help, and it 
will not be enough if advisors are furnished and are no more than the 
advisors of the past ߑ We must ensure that the advisors are not ig-
nored.17 
In opposition to Lord Noel-Buxton߈s viewpoint, Viscount Cecil of 
Cherwood countered, 
 
15 EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I, Selected Speeches, 1967, pp. 338߃339. 
16 RICHARD PANKHURST, ߋPost-World War II Ethiopia: British Military Policy and 
Action for the Dismantling and Acquisition of Italian Factories and Other Assets, 
1941߃1942ߌ, Journal of Ethiopian Studies 29 (1), 1996, pp. 40߃41. 
17 HANSARD߈s, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. CXXI, 1942, col. 651. 
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If we are going to try and contain the Government of Abyssinia, she 
will not be free and independent, and if we meant to do that we ought 
to have told the Emperor candidly that we could only engage in op-
erations to restore him to the throne if he were prepared to submit to 
guidance and direction by us.18 
In the realm of British public opinion, the appointment of British advi-
sors to the Ethiopian court was equally contested in its vehemence. Sir 
George Maxwell, the British delegate to the Slavery Committee of the 
League of Nations, argued, 
Either the advisor is of little use because his advice can be ignored, or, 
if his advice must be acted upon, he is in effect the master of the man 
whom he advises ߑ Let us face the facts at the outset, and let all par-
ties concerned realize that a Government servant, exclusively in the 
employment of the Emperor, is a better officer than an advisor whose 
allegiance is divided.19 
Margery Perham, author of The Government of Ethiopia responded, 
To turn the advisers into employees certainly solves this problem, but 
it throws the responsibility back partly upon the Emperor, in the 
hope that he and his successors will be able to bear it, and partly 
upon our diplomatic representative.20 
While this debate proceeded, Emperor aylÃ llase I quickly took steps 
to obstruct the actions of British advisors and neutralize their hold over his 
court. His first move occurred within a week of his return to the throne. 
Since We had begun work on the New Ethiopia even before the con-
clusion of the war in Ethiopia, five days after We entered Addis 
Abeba [sic], on Gembot [sic] 2, 1933 [10 May, 1941], We established a 
cabinet composed of seven ministers.21 
These handpicked remnants of the Ethiopian bureaucracy held sway over 
foreign affairs, education, justice, commerce, finance, public works, com-
munications, health, security and agriculture. These ministers and their 
subordinates obstructed the British in their attempt to administratively run 
the country by mishandling official documents produced by their occupier 
and by ignoring recommendations submitted by British advisors. Within a 
 
18 HANSARD߈s, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. CXXI, 1942, col. 655. 
19 The Times (London), 2 December 1941. 
20 Ibid., 6 December 1941. 
21 EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I, My Life and Ethiopia߈s Progress, 1994, p. 167. 
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confidential note from Sir Robert G. Howe, the British Minister to Ethio-
pia, to Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, the former re-
ported, 
Men such as Stafford and Mathew are young service specialists who 
know all the technical details of their jobs and are used to seeing a job 
put in hand rapidly and efficiently in orderly British colonies. When 
such men see their advice rendered nugatory by obstruction or inabil-
ity [? Group omitted: ? of] Ethiopians and have to witness disgraceful 
conditions in administration for continuance of which they believe 
their services and the outside world will hold them responsible, they 
are unwilling to incur [group undecipherable: ? odium] of remaining 
under such conditions.22 
To further strengthen his hold over his empire and weaken British con-
trol, Emperor aylÃ llase I ߇quickly resurrected provincial and local gov-
ernments, paying off debts incurred to insurgent leaders for their long 
struggle and buying continuing fidelity.߈23 This tactic worked so efficiently 
that the British were compelled to work within the imperial administration 
Emperor aylÃ llase I established rather than duplicate, undermine or 
dissolve it by force. Once the British began to work within his bureaucracy, 
Emperor aylÃ llase I achieved de facto administrative control over his 
empire. Though the Emperor of Ethiopia signed the Anglo-Ethiopian 
Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 which not only established 
British suzerainty over Ethiopia but also prevented him from appointing 
additional advisors to administrative and judicial positions; prior to the 
agreement, Emperor aylÃ llase I had nine months to appoint ministers, 
civil servants and bureaucrats from among his people and establish adminis-
trative chains of command that could easily frustrate or obstruct British 
advisors.24 By the time Emperor aylÃ llase I signed the Anglo-Ethiopian 
Agreement of 1944 which formally ended the British military occupation of 
Ethiopia and granted Ethiopian independence, his bureaucracy was firmly 
entrenched and managing the affairs of the empire. 
 
22 R.G. HOWE, ߋMr. Howe to Mr. Edenߌ 19 June 1943, in: PRESTON ߃ PARTRIDGE (eds.), 
British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 1989, p. 156. 
23 MARCUS, A History of Ethiopia, 1994, p. 152. 
24 The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 is an arbitrary title 
the author of this text assigned to this agreement. The proper title of this agreement 
can be found in ߋAppendix I: Agreement and Military Convention between The 
United Kingdom and Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, January 31, 1942ߌ, in: Lord RENNEL OF 
RODD, British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa, London: His 
Majesty߈s Stationery Office 1948, p. 540. 
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Opportunism and Territorial Control 
From the moment Emperor aylÃ llase I was restored to the imperial 
throne, he knew that to regain territorial control over his country the re-
moval of the majority of British troops from Ethiopian soil was paramount. 
His victory speech on the palace steps highlighted his concern over this 
issue, ߇It is my firm wish and purpose to merit the blessing with which God 
in His mercy has visited us. By the release of the Imperial [British] troops to 
fight the common enemy on other fronts, and by supplying them with 
troops whenever they may be needed.߈25 In the immediate aftermath of the 
ousting of the Italians from Ethiopia, the British occupied the Horn of Af-
rican empire with elements of the First South African Division, the 11th and 
12th African Divisions comprised of British Kenyan, Nigerian and Ghana-
ian troops, and the Fourth and Fifth Indian Divisions concentrated 
throughout the population centres of Ethiopia. The emperor knew that 
after five years of occupation by the Italians and insurrection by the Ethio-
pian patriots his people were too exhausted to directly challenge the full 
military might of a well-trained, well-armed and well-led British Army. 
Contributing to this factor was the unknown number of Ethiopian patriots 
whose size as an effective fighting force could only be hinted at because 
they were scattered throughout the country. Meanwhile, the size of the 
army that accompanied Emperor aylÃ llase I when he crossed the Suda-
nese-Ethiopian border on his march to Addis AbÃba was woefully small. 
Led by Major Orde Charles Wingate ߇who transformed the emperor߈s rag-
tag assortment of 1,670 Ethiopian exiles, European eccentrics and Sudanese 
misfits into a highly trained and disciplined unit called Gideon Force,߈26 the 
Emperor of Ethiopia only had this unit and the Ethiopian patriots to rely 
upon if he decided to militarily engage the British in a second Anglo-
Abyssinian war. Possibly realizing the folly of such a strategy, Emperor 
aylÃ llase I relied upon Allied military setbacks in North Africa to 
prompt the British to re-deploy their forces to other theatres of war and 
largely quit the empire with the exception of a few select areas by the time 
of the first Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention signed on 
31 January 1942. 
From 5 May 1941 to 31 January 1942 the Second World War was turning 
against the Allies in North Africa. On 16 May 1941 General Erwin Rommel 
was ordered by Berlin to leave Tobruk, Tunisia in Italian hands and concen-
trate his Afrika Korps against the British along the Egyptian border. The 
 
25 EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I, Selected Speeches, 1967, p. 338. 
26 MARCUS, A History of Ethiopia, 1994, p. 151. 
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following month, on 4 June 1941 Luftwaffe bombers executed a night raid on 
the port of Alexandria in Egypt killing 100 civilians. Four months later, on 23 
November 1941 the Afrika Korps defeated elements of the British 30th and 
13th Corps at the Battle of Sidi Rezegh in Libya. During the following year on 
21 January 1942 Rommel launched a counter-offensive against the British 
Eighth Army, and eight days later on 30 January 1942 his Afrika Korps cap-
tured the city of Benghazi, Libya.27 This victory would eventually lead to 
Rommel߈s fateful confrontation with General Bernard Montgomery at the 
Battle of El-Alamein in August 1942. The Allied military situation in North 
Africa proved so dire that British and Ethiopian calls for British troop re-
deployments from Ethiopia to other battlefronts echoed throughout official 
and unofficial channels. In a progress report to the House of Commons, 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced, ߇It is fortunate therefore, that 
the Italian collapse in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and in British and Italian Somali-
land is liberating progressively very substantial forces and masses of transport 
to reinforce the Army of the Nile.߈28 In a message to the people of East Africa, 
Emperor aylÃ llase I admitted, ߇I myself have decided to build up a con-
siderable central army in order to dissolve the feudal system in Ethiopia. If the 
English-speaking world helps me to organize this force rapidly, not only will 
the forces of my neighbours be released for service elsewhere, but frontier 
relations will also benefit.߈29 And during debates within the House of Lords 
over the establishment of a British military mission to create and train the new 
army as part of the terms of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military 
Convention of 1942, Lord Davies concluded, 
The military clauses contemplate first of all a Military Mission. I am 
sure that is heartily welcomed by the Emperor, and by all the friends 
of Abyssinia, but there is also to be apparently a force of occupation 
which is to guard the railway and other parts of the country. I do not 
imagine that we can afford at the present time to employ a consider-
able force in policing a country which belongs to our friends and at 
the same time fight our battles against the enemy. After all we have 
limited man-power.30 
With these concerns in mind the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Mili-
tary Convention of 1942 permitted Emperor aylÃ llase I to formally 
 
27 JAMES KILBURNE WORDSWORTH BINGHAM ߃ WERNER HAUPT, North African Cam-
paign 1940߃1943, London: MacDonald & Company 1968, pp. 70߃72, 79߃80. 
28 The Times (London), 10 April 1941. 
29 Ibid., 13 May 1941. 
30 HANSARD߈s, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. CXXI, 1942, col. 671. 
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regain de facto territorial control over most of Ethiopia. While Article II of 
the Military Convention authorized Great Britain to ߇provide, at their own 
cost, a Military Mission for the purpose of raising, organizing and training, 
the Ethiopian Army߈31 it also authorized that the Military Mission would be 
withdrawn if the Emperor no longer needed it or the British withdrew from 
the Reserved Areas they continued to occupy. These Reserved Areas were 
outlined in Article V to include the territory of the Ogaden which was re-
manded to the control of the British Military Administration of Somalia 
and Article IX which appointed the General Officer Commanding-in-
Chief, the British Forces in East Africa to ߇Continue to use and occupy 
without payment any immovable property formerly belonging to the Italian 
State which he still requires. Continue the British military operation, man-
agement and maintenance of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway.߈32 For Emperor 
aylÃ llase I the aforementioned terms of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agree-
ment and Military Convention may have been bittersweet. On the one 
hand, the North African campaign and the agreement reduced the size of 
the British occupation force and permitted him to establish a centralized 
indigenous army and police force under his direct command. On the other 
hand, the agreement legally bestowed upon the British the right to occupy 
the region of the Ogaden and secure the Franco-Ethiopian Railway for an 
additional period of two years. And with the removal of British troops from 
the majority of Ethiopian territory, Emperor aylÃ llase I was able to 
maintain regional control through the Ethiopian patriots and their leaders 
until his new police force and army could be properly trained. For example, 
Ras AbbÃbÃ ArÃgay, the chief patriot leader of ĿÃwa, was appointed Gover-
nor of the provinces of Sidamo and Borana in October 1941. BitwÃddÃd 
MÃngÃŀa ÃmbÃre, leader of the patriots of Goam, was appointed Vice-
Governor General and Chief of the Armies of that province in March 1942. 
And Fitawrari BÃqqÃlÃ WÃyya, chief patriot leader for the Mount Zuquala 
and Guarage regions, was appointed Governor of the provinces of WÃllÃga 
and Sayo in July 1942 to name three among several such appointees.33 
While the Emperor of Ethiopia opportunistically utilized the Allied de-
feats and Nazi victories during the early years of the Second World War to 
repeatedly push for British troop re-deployments, he formally utilized the 
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Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 to establish 
de facto territorial control over most of his empire. His gratitude for this 
restoration of power and the British withdrawal on somewhat favourable 
terms was made manifest several months later. ߋFull reports have now 
reached London of a ceremony in Addis Ababa, when the Emperor took a 
friendly farewell of the British troops. He gave a luncheon to all of them 
including about 100 British officers and men, and 600 men of the King߈s 
African Rifles and other African troops.ߌ34 
Brinksmanship and Infrastructural Control 
During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Fascist Italy improved and in-
vested in its new colony߈s infrastructure. The Italians established a car re-
pair works, an oxygen factory, a tire re-treading plant, a canvas factory, a 
brewery, a flour and biscuit factory, a series of cotton mills, a rope factory, 
an electricity plant, a boot and shoe factory, an offal factory, and a cigarette 
factory in Addis AbÃba along with improvements to the road and railways 
of Ethiopia.35 In an assessment of the Italian investment in Ethiopia, Lord 
Hailey confessed to the House of Lords, 
We may think what we like of the Italian invasion and its methods, but 
the fact remains that they have left in the country capital assets which 
cannot be valued at less than  80,000,000 or  90,000,000 after making 
all deductions.36 
A special correspondent for The Times confirmed these findings, 
Among the most important of the other results of the Italian occupa-
tion may be accounted the modernization of the principal towns: the 
construction of houses, shops, offices, and workshops on the Euro-
pean pattern ߑ Some of them contain useful industrial plant. The 
ubiquitous motor repair shops are the most obvious example, but 
there are also sawmills, cement, brick, and tile works, and factories 
for the production of such things as boots and coarser textiles.37 
However, before the liberation of Ethiopia was completed by the British 
Army and the Ethiopian patriots, the Occupied Enemy Territorial Admini-
stration (OETA) implemented plans to seize, dismantle and relocate the 
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Italian-built plants, factories, workshops and mills and transport them to 
other colonies of the British Empire where they could be utilized to pro-
duce war material for the Allied cause. ߋPlans for dismantling of Italian 
industries developed fast. The Italian fascist surrender at Gondar, on 27 
November 1941, marked the end of the British East African Campaign. 
Five days later the British military authorities made their first detailed pro-
posals for the dismantling of Italian assets in Ethiopia.ߌ38 From 27 Novem-
ber 1941 until 28 February 1942, the British Army by Ethiopian estimates 
stripped the empire of 80 per cent of its Italian-created industrial infrastruc-
ture.39 Up until the enactment of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Mili-
tary Convention of 1942, Emperor aylÃ llase I lacked a legal and mili-
tary recourse to halt these industrial asset seizures. The emperor had signed 
no treaty, convention or agreement with Great Britain which would have 
determined the disposition of such property. In addition to this legal prob-
lem, Emperor aylÃ llase I lacked a trained military or an organized po-
lice force to nationally challenge the OETA seizures. The Emperor of 
Ethiopia߈s sole recourse was to express his disapproval to Sir Robert Howe 
over these property seizures. However, a legal recourse did emerge with the 
signing of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention of 
1942. Within that document, Article XIII stated, ߇His Majesty the Emperor 
will at the request of the General Office Commanding-in-Chief, the British 
Forces in East Africa, requisition a hand over to the British Forces any pri-
vate property outside the areas referred to in Article III which may be re-
quired by these forces, subject to the reasonable needs of Ethiopia.߈40 The 
key to this tenet was that OETA had to request from Emperor aylÃ 
llase I for his permission to extract any future industrial assets before they 
could requisition them. On 28 February 1942 OETA failed to seek his per-
mission when they attempted to seize the imma sisal rope factory. In an 
armed confrontation between British African troops and Ethiopian patriots 
led by DÃazma GÃrÃsu Duki, the leader of imma, five Ethiopian patri-
ots and two British African soldiers were killed when his forces refused to 
permit the British to requisition the factory because they perceived that one 
of the trucks the British was using had been captured in battle by the Ethio-
pians during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War and rightly belonged to them. 
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On this pretext and acknowledging that no formal request was lobbied by 
OETA, Emperor aylÃ llase I ordered DÃazma GÃrÃsu Duki߈s forces 
to prevent the convoy of trucks from moving or the British African troops 
from dismantling the factory. Sir Robert Howe noted, ߋIn view, therefore, 
of the orders which had been given by the convoy commander, to escort the 
convoy intact to Addis Ababa, it seemed certain that bloodshed would oc-
cur when either the twenty lorries containing the Rope Factory plant were 
left behind or the Emperor߈s orders were countermanded. It was for this 
reason that I asked for an audience.ߌ41 Then over a period of several tense 
days in which Sir Robert Howe and Sir Philip Mitchell attempted to bully 
the Emperor of Ethiopia into submission on this issue, he refused to yield 
and made his full displeasure over OETA߈s industrial requisitions known to 
his occupier. Sir Robert Howe recounted, 
It is His Majesty߈s most frequent allegation that the British military 
authorities gave him assurances that they would keep him informed 
of all requisitions, and that they would pay him compensation for 
them. His Majesty states that none of these assurances were kept. On 
their side the military authorities said that none of these assurances 
were given, but that, with a few exceptions, most of the requisitions 
were decided by a joint Anglo-Ethiopian commission.42 
Regardless of whether or not Emperor aylÃ llase I was legally in the 
right to prevent the British from requisitioning the imma sisal rope fac-
tory or whether OETA had gone through the proper channels to dismantle 
the facility, the end result of the emperor߈s brinksmanship with the British 
Empire over this matter was the cessation of all future requisitions of Italian 
industrial assets in Ethiopia. In a correspondence with Anthony Eden who 
complied with his following suggestion, a beleaguered Sir Robert Howe 
declared, ߋAccordingly, I recommend that when our present list of re-
quirements has been substantially satisfied we shall make no further de-
mands on the Ethiopian Government for the materiel which still remains to 
them, unless a very good case for its removal can be made.ߌ43 
With this firm stance against the British military߈s policy of requisition-
ing his nation߈s industries, the Emperor of Ethiopia assumed de facto con-
trol over the infrastructure of his empire. While he may have acted too 
slowly in preventing the majority of British requisitions as a whole, Em-
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peror aylÃ llase I eventually challenged OETA over its wilful neglect of 
his authority prior to and including the confrontation in imma. The em-
peror was clearly resolved to engage in an open conflict to assert and main-
tain his imperial power. While OETA may have been willing to accept his 
challenge through a contest of arms, the British Foreign Office was reluc-
tant to do the same and concluded OETA߈s requisitions. And while Em-
peror aylÃ llase I did not anticipate the British Foreign Office restrain-
ing OETA, the Emperor of Ethiopia still engaged in a game of brinksman-
ship with the British military over his nation߈s infrastructure, compelled 
them to acquiesce over future requisitions, and regained de facto control 
over most of his empire߈s infrastructure. 
Leverage and Economic Control 
Under the terms of Article IV of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Mili-
tary Convention of 1942, Emperor aylÃ llase I conceded in 
order to facilitate the absorption into the Ethiopian economy of the 
funds to be provided under paragraph (a) above, and to promote the 
early resumption of trade between Ethiopia and the surrounding ter-
ritories, His Majesty the Emperor agrees that in all matters relating to 
currency in Ethiopia the Government of the United Kingdom shall 
be consulted and that arrangements concerning it shall be made only 
with the concurrence of that Government.44 
In adherence with the terms of the agreement the emperor consulted the 
British government about stabilizing the value of Ethiopia߈s official cur-
rency, the Maria Theresa dollar. The Italians during their occupation intro-
duced the Italian lira to Ethiopia while the British during their ouster of the 
Italians followed suit with the East African shilling. By the time Emperor 
aylÃ llase I returned to the imperial throne in 1941, Ethiopia circulated 
three different currencies whose variable rates of exchange contributed to 
the crippling of the empire߈s economy. 
The disadvantages of a currency based on the silver dollar led the 
Controller of Finance and Accounts, Nairobi, to put forward pro-
posals for a new Ethiopian currency to be linked to sterling, wholly 
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divorced from the silver dollar, and to be operated by a currency 
board in London.45 
With some minor modifications in these proposals, Emperor aylÃ 
llase I approved this new currency in June 1942 but slowly realized that 
he may have increased his nation߈s economic dependency upon Great Brit-
ain. Within the Ethiopian government, 
It was felt that both the location and the composition of the Cur-
rency Board implied a derogation of the Emperor߈s sovereignty, a 
dangerous lack of Ethiopian control and an excessive British control. 
Moreover, the Ethiopian Government felt that a currency backed 
solely by British securities or sterling cash was, in time of war, insuf-
ficiently stable, and they therefore suggested a 30 percent gold back-
ing to be provided from Ethiopian gold resources.46 
But this request was merely the herald for a more ambitious project 
which, if it proved successful, could have ensured Ethiopia߈s economic sov-
ereignty. Emperor aylÃ llase I submitted a counter offer of an Ethiopian 
national bank to the original British offer of a Currency Board which 
would have retained a British management board located in Addis AbÃba as 
opposed to London.47 When the British staunchly refused to entertain the 
creation of an Ethiopian national bank, the Emperor of Ethiopia created the 
bank by edict, capitalized it nominally with one million Maria Theresa dol-
lars, yet rested its solvency upon, 
Maria Theresa dollars, Italian lira, East African pounds, and Indian 
pounds. The fluctuating values and difficulties of exchange of all 
these currencies kept the emperor constantly under pressure to accept 
British terms and resort to a Currency Board. Pressed by Ethiopia߈s 
poor financial status, in May 1942 Haile Selassie decided to appeal to 
the United States for both financial and political aid.48 
Long before Emperor aylÃ llase I lodged his formal request for eco-
nomic and political assistance from the United States the American gov-
ernment displayed more than a passing interest in British activities in 
Ethiopia during its post-liberation period. Herschel Johnson, the Minister-
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Counsellor of Embassy in the United Kingdom, in a letter to Wallace 
Murray, the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs at the United 
States Department of State acknowledged, 
As reported in my dispatch No. 498 of today߈s date, the Foreign Of-
fice still considers the Emperor߈s restoration in the nature of an ex-
periment. It desires to use the Emperor as an instrument of authority 
in a part of Ethiopia and also accordingly give his government a 
measure of recognition but is making clear to the Emperor that he 
must act only by and with British consent. The British Government 
is far from being prepared to admit the Emperor߈s government to the 
status of an ally or to state when it might again recognize Ethiopia as 
a fully independent state.49 
Part of America߈s political interest in Ethiopia stemmed from Ethiopia߈s 
status as the first nation liberated from Axis rule and its post-war develop-
ment could have served as a future test case for other liberated countries if 
the Allies proved victorious. The other part of America߈s political interest in 
the British occupation of Ethiopia stemmed from Great Britain߈s adherence 
to an agreement that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minis-
ter Winston Churchill signed on 14 August 1941 ߃ the Atlantic Charter. 
This treaty bound the two nations to a post-war environment in which, 
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Sec-
ond, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with 
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they re-
spect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self gov-
ernment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.50 
While the British may have considered the Atlantic Charter to be little 
more than an instrument to help break American isolationism and bring the 
United States into the Second World War as an ally at a future date, the 
Americans utilized the agreement as a guidepost for interacting with liber-
ated nations in the upcoming post-war world. When Emperor aylÃ 
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llase I called upon the Americans for aid, the United States may have 
viewed his request through the idealistic lens of The Atlantic Charter. 
As early as October 1942 Emperor aylÃ llase I wanted the Americans 
to establish a legation in Ethiopia to serve as a counterbalance to the British 
legation in Addis AbÃba. E. Talbot Smith, the American Consul at AsmÃra 
reported to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
Does the Emperor suggest that he would like an American Legation es-
tablished at Addis Ababa to observe the operation of his Government 
under the treaty of January 31 1942? I feel secure, having interviewed 
him twice and having had several long conferences with his closest ad-
visor, the Minister of Pen [WÃldÃ Giyorgis WÃldÃ Yoanns] that this 
is exactly what he means.51 
After the American legation was established in Addis AbÃba the follow-
ing year, the Emperor of Ethiopia instructed his Vice Minister of Finance, 
Ylma DÃrÃssa, to seek a loan of $ 40 million as credit to be made available 
in the United States in cash balance, to purchase consumer goods, and re-
build Ethiopia with an additional loan of $ 10 million under the Lend-Lease 
Act of 1941 to stabilize the Maria Theresa dollar.52 The American reaction 
to his requests was overwhelming. Not only did the United States lend-lease 
5,430,000 ounces of silver for the purpose of coinage in Ethiopia and fulfil 
its request for credit but also dispatched a mission of agricultural, mining, 
engineering, economic and medical experts to help the Ethiopians rebuild 
their country in December 1943.53 
The State Department߈s decision to lend-lease silver to Ethiopia enabled 
the emperor to return to his scheme of creating a national bank. Selassie 
used American silver to mint fresh Maria Theresa dollars. He decided 
to exchange the new dollars for old currency already in circulation, 
which could then be kept as reserves against a proposed paper issue. 
This was compatible to the Americans because they could recover the 
lend-lease silver once the new paper currency was accepted by the 
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Ethiopian population. The scheme also suited Selassie because it al-
lowed him to secure his new bank with silver reserves.54 
Also the lend-lease of silver to Ethiopia permitted Emperor aylÃ 
llase I to achieve de facto economic control over Ethiopia. By leveraging 
the Americans from their distant legation in AsmÃra into the political heart 
of his struggle against the British in Addis AbÃba, he set his new ally against 
the British on issues that extended far beyond the creation of the Ethiopian 
national bank and the stabilization of the Maria Theresa dollar. For exam-
ple, in a letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt it was acknowledged that 
The appeal of the Emperor, as expressed by Yilma Deressa [Ylma 
DÃrÃssa], for the ߇diplomatic cooperation߈ of this Government in con-
nection with the drafting and negotiation of a new Anglo-Ethiopian 
treaty would seem to imply a desire on the part of Ethiopia that we use 
our good office with the British in gaining terms more satisfactory to 
the Ethiopians in any future treaty which might be signed.55 
Though Ethiopia required agricultural, economic and infrastructural de-
velopment and would receive such aid from the United States during and 
after the Second World War and one year after the British promised and 
delivered  1,500,000 during the first year of their occupation  1,000,000 
during the second year of the agreement;  500,000 during the third year 
and  250,000 during the fourth year as part of the terms of the Anglo-
Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention of 1942, Emperor aylÃ 
llase I leveraged the United States of America against the British Empire 
in an international gambit to weaken Great Britain߈s hold over the Ethio-
pian economy long enough so that he could stabilize the Maria Theresa 
dollar and establish a national bank whereby he could achieve de facto eco-
nomic control over his empire by the end of 1943.56 
Propaganda and Informational Control 
In the ensuing months after Emperor aylÃ llase I regained his throne on 
5 May 1941, the emperor confronted an active yet uncoordinated disinfor-
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mation campaign designed to weaken and discredit his rule both within 
Ethiopia and abroad. As he recorded within his autobiography, ߋAmong 
the British military officers in Ethiopia, there was a person called Brigadier 
[Maurice S.] Lush, who led a political group which had sinister intentions 
toward Our country. They spoke publicly that the purpose of their coming 
was to rule Ethiopia.ߌ57 In the House of Lords a version of this propaganda 
campaign ensued when Lord Noel-Buxton declared, 
The Emperor is helpless without our protection. We are responsible 
for his restoration and consequently for the welfare, up to a point, of 
the population. We must remember that more than half the popula-
tion of the country is not Abyssinian who have no voice whatever as 
to the Government and cannot express their wishes ߃ to use the words 
of the Atlantic Charter.58 
This campaign of disinformation even continued in diplomatic circles 
when it was revealed in a communiquÈ between Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull and the American Minister in Egypt, Kirk, 
We have a reply to the effect that if Ethiopia should express a desire 
to adhere to the Declaration [of the United Nations], the British 
would issue no objection. However, the British appear to be averse to 
encouraging such initiative by Ethiopia because they feel it would 
lead to demands for material assistance now which might be difficult 
to furnish and probably to some territorial or other claims after the 
war as a reward for adherence. Furthermore, they feel it might lead to 
a desire by Ethiopia to play a more active role in the war, thus result-
ing in confusion and difficulties.59 
But in Ethiopia proper, this campaign of disinformation started to have 
tragic consequences, ߋIn Harer, the propaganda campaign conducted by a 
British political officer among the Gerri Kocher Somalis resulted in civil 
conflict. He was responsible for the bloodshed which occurred.ߌ60 Whether 
the Emperor of Ethiopia foresaw that such a campaign of disinformation 
would be directed against his rule by the very same government that helped 
restore him to power is uncertain. What is certain is that during his exile in 
England in the aftermath of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, Emperor 
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aylÃ llase I found both an advocate and champion for his nation߈s inde-
pendence in the most un-likeliest of people, Estelle Sylvia Pankhurst. 
Sylvia Pankhurst was born in Manchester, England on 5 May 1882. In 
1906 she began her career as a campaigner in the British suffragette move-
ment by helping her mother, Emmeline Pankhurst, and sister, Christabel 
Pankhurst, to found the Women߈s Social and Political Union (WSPU).61 
When the organization began to radicalise its protest tactics through the 
usage of violence, Sylvia broke with the WSPU and founded the East Lon-
don Federation of Suffragettes in 1914 which eventually shifted far enough 
to the political left that she renamed it the Communist Party, British Sec-
tion of the Third International to reflect her own Communist leanings. 
However, her support for leftist communists and disagreement with such 
Communist Party notables as V.I. Lenin at Comintern meetings in Russia 
eventually compelled her to eliminate all ties to the party. During the 1920s 
Sylvia Pankhurst shifted her attention away from communism and towards 
anti-imperialism and anti-fascism. 
When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, she joined the Abyssinian Society 
which was established to financially support Ethiopian refugees and aid 
them in meeting their daily needs.62 
In this crusade, as in others, Sylvia acted independently. She organ-
ized demonstrations in Hyde Park, Trafalgar Square and in front of 
the Houses of Parliament, using a few of her old friends from the 
East End, occasional new sympathizers with Ethiopia, or these more 
specifically anti-Fascist. Sylvia used any method she could, and in do-
ing so broke ranks with the more conservative members of the Abys-
sinian Society. Her demonstrations and underrated ߇news߈ in the pa-
per were constant sources of friction.63 
Not long after she split with the Abyssinian Society, Sylvia Pankhurst 
found the opportunity to interview Emperor aylÃ llase I when he ar-
rived in London in 1936. 
Initially, the suffragette from Manchester did not like the emperor from 
Ejersa Goro and stated to him personally, ߋMeeting Haile Selassie a few 
days later my mother explained that she was a republican, and did not sup-
port him because he was an Emperor, but because ߇his cause was just.߈ He 
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quietly replied, ߇I know!߈ߌ64 But what began as an alliance of convenience 
between the Emperor of Ethiopia and a British anti-imperialist blossomed 
into a life-long friendship which reaped huge dividends for both parties 
during and after the Italian and British occupations. 
In the person of Emperor aylÃ llase I, Sylvia Pankhurst gained some-
thing which she did not possess-legitimacy. Though she earned a measure of 
respect and a reputation as a suffragette and communist, Sylvia Pankhurst 
had no legitimacy as an advocate and champion of Ethiopia. Prior to her 
encounter with Emperor aylÃ llase I and the second Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia; Sylvia Pankhurst never studied about Africa or Ethiopia at a uni-
versity, never attended a rally, conference or meeting that addressed African 
or Ethiopian concerns and never travelled to Africa let alone Ethiopia. Her 
interviews with Emperor aylÃ llase I and other members of the imperial 
family such as his wife, Empress MÃnÃn Asfaw of AmbassÃl, and his daugh-
ter, Princess Tsehai, allowed Sylvia Pankhurst to eloquently address Ethio-
pia߈s concerns before a British and international public which could have 
dismissed her as being an anti-imperialist, anti-fascist malcontent who knew 
nothing about the cause she championed. Sylvia Pankhurst߈s association 
with Emperor aylÃ llase I gave her enough legitimacy to prevent her 
from being completely dismissed by her opponents. 
In the person of Sylvia Pankhurst, Emperor aylÃ llase I gained a tire-
less crusader who fearlessly held the Italians, the British and the world re-
sponsible for the Second Italo-Ethiopian War and the subsequent British 
occupation of Ethiopia. Though she continued to instigate rallies, meetings 
and protests against the Italian and later British occupation, her main venue 
for expressing her outrage appeared within the pages of her newspaper, 
New Times & Ethiopia News (NT&EN). In May 1936 ߋand under the edi-
torship of Sylvia Pankhurst, a weekly newspaper entitled New Times & 
Ethiopia News was established and published every Saturday. This newspa-
per helped put Us [Emperor aylÃ llase I] loudly to voice Ethiopia߈s 
woes and to capture a worldwide audience.ߌ65 Initially the goal of NT&EN 
was to defend the case of Ethiopian independence and attack Italian Fascist 
and Nazis aggression as well as defend the cause of other nations victimized 
by the Axis. Once the Ethiopian patriots and the British Army liberated the 
Horn of African nation, Sylvia Pankhurst redirected her attacks squarely 
against the British occupation in a bid for full Ethiopian independence and 
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sovereignty. On nearly every issue Emperor aylÃ llase I confronted 
during the occupation, the New Times & Ethiopia News expressed the 
opinions of not only its editor, Sylvia Pankhurst, but also the views of con-
tributors such as Helen Napier of the Friends of Abyssinia League of Ser-
vice; Professor Angelo Crespi, a teacher at the University of London; Dr. 
Ruth Schulze-Goevernitz, an Austrian professor; Eric Virgin, Emperor 
aylÃ llase I߈s former military advisor from Sweden and an American 
aviator, Count Hillaire du Berrier.66 For example, when a cloud of doubt 
began to emerge over whether or not the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and 
Military Convention of 1942 had been agreed upon by both the British and 
Ethiopian Empires. Sylvia Pankhurst made clear her stance on the matter, 
We sincerely hope these strange confusions will be obliterated and 
compensated shortly by the news that a fully satisfactory Agreement 
has been signed accordingly ߃ Complete Ethiopian independence, 
Restitution of all Ethiopian territory held before the Italian invasion, 
A loan to Ethiopia by Great Britain, the United States, or both, on 
fair terms, the Right of Ethiopia to recover the former Ethiopian ter-
ritories held by Italy since the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
must be provided for, Ethiopia߈s need for access to the sea must be 
early met.67 
On the issue of territorial control pertaining to the possible partition of 
Ethiopia through a British special plebiscite in the Ogaden, NT&EN de-
clared, ߋWe make no apology for dealing in strong and emphatic terms with 
the dangerous and persistent intrigue to dismember Ethiopia which is oper-
ating in the areas reserved to British military occupation ߑ The matter 
must be probed to its source, there must be no toleration of the duplicity 
and chicanery which has too often sullied the record of the European Great 
Powers in their relations with African peoples.ߌ68 When the administrative 
controversy over the appointment of British and Ethiopian advisers to Em-
peror aylÃ llase I emerged, Sylvia Pankhurst railed, 
The Emperor further emphasized his desire to be kept fully informed 
by Generals Platt and Cunningham and Major (now Lieutenant-
Colonel) Wingate, as well as by the Chief and Deputy Chief Political 
Officers, of their plans and the progress of their work ߃ and here the 
Emperor was explicit ߃ of the appointments they desired to have 
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made by him. He was not prepared to surrender the right to make 
appointments, and in a tactful phrase he made that clear.69 
When the controversy over the British removal of Ethiopia߈s infrastructure 
emerged, the NT&EN admitted, ߋThere is now a tremendous dearth of 
equipment and trained personnel. The Italians destroyed what they could; the 
British have removed much of what remained ߑ The Emperor generously 
agreed that everything which could be of assistance to the war effort of the 
United Nations might be taken by the British Allies ߃ whether Ethiopian raw 
or other material, or booty captured from the Italians. This agreement has 
been very freely taken advantage of.ߌ70 On the issue of Ethiopia߈s control 
over its economic future, Sylvia Pankhurst offered, 
Before we consider some actual details of the export trade, I must al-
lude to the greatest single factor ߃ apart from those due to the war 
and common to all countries ߃ which has operated against this re-
vival, namely, the rise in value of the Maria Theresa dollar from 1s.10 
 d. in 1942 to 3s. to-day ߑ The rise of the M.T. dollar was primarily 
due to the withdrawal by our military authorities in Nairobi of the 
silver dollar reserve, which alone had enable Barclays Bank to main-
tain the then official dollar rate of 1s.10  d. The withdrawal under-
mined confidence in the shilling because the Bank could no longer 
sell M.T. dollars against shillings.71 
Finally over the issue of the British disinformation campaign in Ethiopia 
against Emperor aylÃ llase I, NT&EN announced, ߋA meeting was held 
under the auspices of the [British] Ministry [of Information] at which Press 
and public were addressed by one speaker ߃ Miss Margery Perham, whose 
propaganda to dismember Ethiopia is well known and who urged from the 
Ministry of Information platform that it would be difficult for Britain to 
restore Ethiopia to her full pre-invasion territories and independence.ߌ72 
However, the extent of Sylvia Pankhurst߈s campaign through the NT&EN 
did not cease with her weekly publication alone but extended into the Houses 
of Parliament. Members of Parliament such as Eleanor Rathbone, Colonel 
Josiah Wedgwood and Peter Freeman among others asked Parliamentary 
questions and signed letters to the press on her behalf, while allies within the 
House of Lords such as Lord Davies and Lord Stamford financially contrib-
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uted to the upkeep of NT&EN.73 Through the questions she asked her Par-
liamentary contacts to pose on the floors of the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords and her pro-Ethiopia, anti-imperialist, anti-fascist rhetoric in 
NT&EN, Sylvia Pankhurst drew the ire of the British government when one 
of her allies in the House of Commons, Eleanor Rathbone [M.P. for Com-
bined English Universities] asked,  
߇Is the Minister aware that this paper, whatever its defects, has been a 
very useful watchdog in the interests of Ethiopia, and that if this par-
ticular article is unjustified, the best way to deal with it is to give a 
definite assurance that no such plebiscite has been arranged or is con-
templated?߈ Mr. [Brendan] Bracken, [Minister of Information] taci-
turnly replied, ߇I am afraid I cannot agree with the hon. Lady. This 
paper contains attacks on England which are worthy of Goebbels. It 
has insulted the British troops who have rescued Ethiopia, and in my 
opinion it is a poisonous rag.߈74 
In spite of the opposition the NT&EN and its editor confronted, it was 
still a popular newspaper for its time. Its circulation reached ten thousand 
copies weekly with editions distributed to members of both Houses of Par-
liament, foreign ambassadors in Britain, British representatives abroad, 
delegates to the League, the press, political parties, trade unions, freema-
son߈s lodges, philanthropic bodies and churches.75 
Above all Sylvia Pankhurst and NT&EN permitted Emperor aylÃ 
llase I to regain informational control over his empire. While the Ethiopian 
emperor never controlled the media or the means by which information about 
his empire was distributed to the world, he did control with the aid of Sylvia 
Pankhurst, the debate over Ethiopia߈s viability as an independent nation. It 
must also be noted that Emperor aylÃ llase I did not encourage Sylvia 
Pankhurst to create NT&EN, the Emperor of Ethiopia did however endorse 
her newspaper by granting interviews featuring him and the imperial family 
and by encouraging others to participate as well. The constant focus of 
NT&EN upon the administrative, economic, territorial, infrastructural and 
informational problems in Ethiopia kept the African empire firmly fixed in 
the British and international consciousness for the duration of the Second 
World War. Where other newspapers such as The Times, The Daily Mail, or 
The Manchester Guardian often buried stories about Ethiopia deep within its 
pages if it reported on them at all during the British occupation, NT&EN 
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kept Ethiopia߈s recovery under British rule on its front pages until the Anglo-
Ethiopian Agreement of 1944 formally ended the British occupation. 
Sylvia Pankhurst and NT&EN also helped Emperor aylÃ llase I to 
reshape world opinion about Ethiopia as a viable, sovereign nation whose 
occupation by the British was a temporary measure rather than as a weak, 
disconsolate aging empire which collapsed into a military protectorate or 
crown colony of the British Empire. Through his alliance with the Man-
chester suffragette, Emperor aylÃ llase I sold his nation to the world as 
a sovereign member of the international community to the extent that both 
he and his ally were rewarded for their efforts. Emperor aylÃ llase I 
won international recognition for his empire߈s sovereignty and independ-
ence by gaining a seat at the United Nations in 1942 and Sylvia Pankhurst 
was awarded the Queen of Sheba medal and the Patriots medal by the em-
peror as well as the privilege for both herself and her son, Richard Pank-
hurst, to immigrate to Ethiopia.76 
Why Was the Emperor߈s Strategy Successful? 
There are two reasons why Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s strategy of resistance 
and the tactics he employed within that strategy succeeded. The first reason 
is that his opposition, the British Empire, was neither united nor coordi-
nated in its occupation of Ethiopia. The main entities of the British gov-
ernment which had a direct bearing upon the occupation ߃ the Foreign Of-
fice, the War Office, OETA and Parliament ߃ harboured opposing views 
which muddled their administrative, economic, territorial, infrastructural 
and informational control over the Horn of African nation. For example, 
The War Office favoured a virtual protectorate, saying that, given the 
chaotic condition of the country and the incapacity of the population, 
close British control would be advantageous to both parties. The 
Foreign Office, however felt that emphasis should be laid on inde-
pendence, rather than control, and agreed that it would set a bad po-
litical precedent to deny independence to the first country to be freed 
from Axis rule.77 
OETA desired to convert Ethiopia into a military protectorate outright 
while the Parliamentary debate over Ethiopia hovered between limited 
autonomy and full sovereignty.78 This confusion over policy may have frus-
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trated Emperor aylÃ llase I in his dealings with the British when he 
noted in his autobiography, 
Before and after We returned to Ethiopia, We declared the nature of 
the relationship between Ethiopia and Britain. But the British mili-
tary officers and troops in Ethiopia, pretending that they did not 
know the nature of the friendship and alliance openly debated in the 
British parliament, began to portray Us and Our people as though we 
resented British assistance.79 
However, those moments of confusion by the British also provided the 
emperor the opportunity to clarify his position on an issue and take advan-
tage of British indecision. A prime example of this scenario was the speed 
Emperor aylÃ llase I demonstrated in establishing his cabinet and secur-
ing the loyalty of the surviving provincial nobility throughout Ethiopia. 
Before the British could assign administrative, economic, political and agri-
cultural advisors to his court, Emperor aylÃ llase I ensconced his bu-
reaucrats into their positions. This lack of policy uniformity among his 
occupiers permitted the Emperor of Ethiopia to counter many British 
thrusts contrary to his goals. 
The second reason Emperor aylÃ llase I߈s strategy of resistance suc-
ceeded was because he wanted to remove the tendrils of British control over 
Ethiopia without entirely removing the British presence. 
Emperor aylÃ llase I realized that it was neither in his best interest 
nor of his empire to immediately call for the complete removal of all British 
troops in Ethiopia upon regaining his throne. He knew he needed the Brit-
ish Military Mission to help maintain order over his empire and train a new 
police force and army which would allow him to centralize his rule once the 
British departed. But the emperor acknowledged that he quickly needed to 
regain full control of his country lest the British arrive at a consensus which 
advocated the governance of Ethiopia as a military protectorate or crown 
colony. Emperor aylÃ llase I employed a strategy of resistance designed 
to covertly and overtly counter in equal measure any challenge to his au-
thority or his nation߈s sovereignty. During the currency debate, when the 
British proposed the establishment of the Ethiopian Currency Board, Em-
peror aylÃ llase I countered them with the Ethiopian National Bank 
when the former threatened his nation߈s economic sovereignty. When 
OETA launched a propaganda campaign throughout Ethiopia to turn ele-
ments of the populace against him; Emperor aylÃ llase I countered them 
by relying upon Sylvia Pankhurst߈s NT&EN to enlighten the British and 
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the world about OETA߈s handling of the occupation of Ethiopia. And 
when the British military attempted to forcefully requisition the imma 
sisal rope factory, the emperor authorized the local authorities in imma to 
resist them. Emperor aylÃ llase I did not overreact to each crisis which 
emerged or committed himself to a course of action which would have 
compelled the British to forcefully or violently crush his resistance to their 
rule. Instead, the Emperor of Ethiopia assessed the threat he confronted, 
covertly or overtly countered it with a firm yet measured response equal to 
the level of threat he faced and gradually wore down his opponent߈s in-
struments of control until he achieved de facto control over his empire. By 
the signing of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944 which guaranteed 
the independence and sovereignty of the Ethiopian Empire, the British Em-
pire was exhausted by both the Second World War and Emperor aylÃ 
llase I߈s strategy of resistance which compelled them to concede their rule 
over the Ethiopian Empire. 
Emperor aylÃ llase I was a master political strategist. In 1941 with 
the aid of the nation to which he was exiled, the Emperor of Ethiopia re-
gained his throne although administrative, economic, informational, infra-
structural and territorial control of his empire belonged to his liberators. By 
1944 Emperor aylÃ llase I regained not only control and mastery over 
most of his empire but also the international recognition of his country as a 
sovereign and independent nation within a new world body created by the 
Allies to replace The League of Nations. By employing a strategy of flexible 
response to British rule, Emperor aylÃ llase I secured his nation߈s future 
in the post-war world. 
Summary 
This article examines how Emperor aylÃ llase I succeeded in removing the British 
military occupation of Ethiopia during World War II with only a minimum of blood-
shed. It outlines the various strategies and tactics the Emperor of Ethiopia employed to 
regain control over his empire.  The text also asserts that he engaged in a pre-Cold War 
variant of the policy of flexible response which permitted him to resist British military 
rule without provoking a violent response from his occupier. The text highlights a hand-
ful of the numerous tactics and strategies which were employed by indigenous leaders 
and their allies not only in Africa but also throughout the developing world to success-
fully resist European colonial rule during and after World War II. 
